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crates.io, #103 most downloaded on crates.io
Web PKI X.509 Certificate Verification.
Latest stable
0.103.17
Last release 10 days ago
12 Nov 2026
Release timing varies
gaps range from 1 weeks to 4 months
Nearly every release is documented
notes for 38 of 38 stable releases
2 versions withdrawn
withdrawn after publishing
4 years old
59 releases · first in 2023
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Distrust a small set of intermediate certificate subject public keys due to specific security concerns around their operation.
Distrust a small set of intermediate certificate subject public keys due to specific security concerns around their operation.
id-ce-issuingDistributionPoint by @ctz in #498Full Changelog: v/0.104.0-alpha.7...v/0.104.0-alpha.8
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v/0.104.0-alpha.8 Pre-release
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Fix reachable panic in parsing a CRL. This was reported to us as GHSA-82j2-j2ch-gfr8. Users who don't use CRLs are not affected.
Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.104.0-alpha.6...v/0.104.0-alpha.7
Full Changelog: v/0.104.0-alpha.6...v/0.104.0-alpha.7
0.104.0-alpha.7 Pre-release
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Bump version to 0.104.0-alpha.6
Bump version to 0.104.0-alpha.6
This vulnerability is thought to be of limited impact. This is because both the certificate and CRL are signed -- an attacker would need to compromise…
Correct selection of candidate CRLs by Distribution Point and Issuing Distribution Point. If a certificate had more than one distributionPoint, then only the first distributionPoint would be considered against each CRL's IssuingDistributionPoint distributionPoint, and then the certificate's subsequent distributionPoints would be ignored.
The impact was that correct provided CRLs would not be consulted to check revocation. With UnknownStatusPolicy::Deny (the default) this would lead to incorrect but safe Error::UnknownRevocationStatus. With UnknownStatusPolicy::Allow this would lead to inappropriate acceptance of revoked certificates.
This vulnerability is thought to be of limited impact. This is because both the certificate and CRL are signed -- an attacker would need to compromise a trusted issuing authority to trigger this bug. An attacker with such capabilities could likely bypass revocation checking through other more impactful means (such as publishing a valid, empty CRL.)
More likely, this bug would be latent in normal use, and an attacker could leverage faulty revocation checking to continue using a revoked credential.
This vulnerability is identified by GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4. Thank you to @1seal for the report.
Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.104.0-alpha.4...v/0.104.0-alpha.5
Correct selection of candidate CRLs by Distribution Point and Issuing Distribution Point. If a certificate had more than one distributionPoint, then only the first distributionPoint would be considered against each CRL's IssuingDistributionPoint distributionPoint, and then the certificate's subsequent distributionPoints would be ignored.
The impact was that correct provided CRLs would not be consulted to check revocation. With UnknownStatusPolicy::Deny (the default) this would lead to incorrect but safe Error::UnknownRevocationStatus. With UnknownStatusPolicy::Allow this would lead to inappropriate acceptance of revoked certificates.
This vulnerability is thought to be of limited impact. This is because both the certificate and CRL are signed -- an attacker would need to compromise a trusted issuing authority to trigger this bug. An attacker with such capabilities could likely bypass revocation checking through other more impactful means (such as publishing a valid, empty CRL.)
More likely, this bug would be latent in normal use, and an attacker could leverage faulty revocation checking to continue using a revoked credential.
This vulnerability is identified by GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4. Thank you to @1seal for the report.
Full Changelog: v/0.104.0-alpha.4...v/0.104.0-alpha.5
0.104.0-alpha.5 Pre-release
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tests: port client auth revocation tests to Rust by @djc in https://github.com/rustls/webpki/pull/442
Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.104.0-alpha.3...v/0.104.0-alpha.4
Full Changelog: v/0.104.0-alpha.3...v/0.104.0-alpha.4
0.104.0-alpha.4 Pre-release
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build(deps): bump actions/checkout from 5 to 6 by @dependabot[bot] in https://github.com/rustls/webpki/pull/415
Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.104.0-alpha.2...v/0.104.0-alpha.3
0.104.0-alpha.3 Pre-release
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Move verify_signed_data() to SignedData::verify() by @djc in https://github.com/rustls/webpki/pull/397
OidDecoder output; test signature algorithm IDs by @ctz in https://github.com/rustls/webpki/pull/401Hash for revocation types by @ctz in https://github.com/rustls/webpki/pull/406Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.104.0-alpha.1...v/0.104.0-alpha.2
Remove deprecated Error variants by @djc in https://github.com/rustls/webpki/pull/391
Add VerifiedPath::issuer_spki() for accessing the encoded SPKI of a verified end entity certificate's issuer.
VerifiedPath::issuer_spki() for accessing the encoded SPKI of a verified end entity certificate's issuer.spki_for_anchor() for accessing the encoded SPKI of a parsed trust anchor.EndEntityCert::sct_log_timestamps() for accessing an iterator of sct::LogIdAndTimestamp entries present in the certificate.Full Changelog: v/0.103.16...v/0.103.17
Distrust a small set of intermediate certificate subject public keys due to specific security concerns around their operation.
Distrust a small set of intermediate certificate subject public keys due to specific security concerns around their operation.
Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.103.14...v/0.103.16
Distrust a small set of intermediate certificate subject public keys due to specific security concerns around their operation.
Full Changelog: v/0.103.14...v/0.103.16
Cargo: avoid all-features in docs.rs by @cpu in #530
Fixes docs.rs build errors.
Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.103.14..v/0.103.15
[0.103] Support stable ML-DSA by @djc in #523
Full Changelog: v/0.103.13...v/0.103.14
Fix reachable panic in parsing a CRL. This was reported to us as GHSA-82j2-j2ch-gfr8. Users who don't use CRLs are not affected.
Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.103.12...v/0.103.13
Full Changelog: v/0.103.12...v/0.103.13
…outside the constraint. This is very similar to CVE-2025-61727.
This release fixes two bugs in name constraint enforcement:
accept.example.com, *.example.com could feasibly allow a name of reject.example.com which is outside the constraint. This is very similar to CVE-2025-61727.Since name constraints are restrictions on otherwise properly-issued certificates, these bugs are reachable only after signature verification and require misissuance to exploit.
Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.103.11...v/0.103.12
In response to #464, we've slightly relaxed requirements for anchor_from_trust_cert() to ignore unknown extensions even if they're marked as critical.
In response to #464, we've slightly relaxed requirements for anchor_from_trust_cert() to ignore unknown extensions even if they're marked as critical. This only affects parsing a TrustAnchor from DER, for which most extensions are ignored anyway.
This vulnerability is thought to be of limited impact. This is because both the certificate and CRL are signed -- an attacker would need to compromise…
Correct selection of candidate CRLs by Distribution Point and Issuing Distribution Point. If a certificate had more than one distributionPoint, then only the first distributionPoint would be considered against each CRL's IssuingDistributionPoint distributionPoint, and then the certificate's subsequent distributionPoints would be ignored.
The impact was that correctly provided CRLs would not be consulted to check revocation. With UnknownStatusPolicy::Deny (the default) this would lead to incorrect but safe Error::UnknownRevocationStatus. With UnknownStatusPolicy::Allow this would lead to inappropriate acceptance of revoked certificates.
This vulnerability is thought to be of limited impact. This is because both the certificate and CRL are signed -- an attacker would need to compromise a trusted issuing authority to trigger this bug. An attacker with such capabilities could likely bypass revocation checking through other more impactful means (such as publishing a valid, empty CRL.)
More likely, this bug would be latent in normal use, and an attacker could leverage faulty revocation checking to continue using a revoked credential.
This vulnerability is identified by GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4. Thank you to @1seal for the report.
Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.103.9...v/0.103.10
[backport] ci: avoid denying warnings on nightly toolchains by @alex in https://github.com/rustls/webpki/pull/437
backport valid_uri_names (#404) to rel-0.103 by @alex in https://github.com/rustls/webpki/pull/408
Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.103.7...v/0.103.8
New feature: Add KeyPurposeId::to_decoded_oid() to help external ExtendedKeyUsageValidators fill RequiredEkuNotFoundContext::present.
KeyPurposeId::to_decoded_oid() to help external ExtendedKeyUsageValidators fill RequiredEkuNotFoundContext::present.Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.103.6...v/0.103.7
The extensible EKU validation released as part of 0.103.5 was actually not usable due to missing type exports, and contained a regression where empty
The extensible EKU validation released as part of 0.103.5 was actually not usable due to missing type exports, and contained a regression where empty ExtendedKeyUsage extensions would not trigger an error. Both issues are fixed in this release.
New feature: support verification of P256+SHA512 and P384-SHA512 ECDSA signatures with aws-lc-rs. This is not a recommended combination, but such sign
Cert methods by @ctz in https://github.com/rustls/webpki/pull/375Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.103.4...v/0.103.5
The related contextless variants have been deprecated.
aws-lc-rs-unstable feature to expose these algorithms (only works when aws-lc-rs-fips is not enabled).UnsupportedSignatureAlgorithmContext, UnsupportedCrlSignatureAlgorithmContext, UnsupportedSignatureAlgorithmForPublicKeyContext and UnsupportedCrlSignatureAlgorithmForPublicKeyContext error variants which contain additional context about the error condition. The related contextless variants have been deprecated.Add support for RSA signature algorithms that don't include parameters. Per RFC 4055 section 5, implementations of the SHA-1/SHA-2 one-way hash functi
Add support for RSA signature algorithms that don't include parameters. Per RFC 4055 section 5, implementations of the SHA-1/SHA-2 one-way hash functions "MUST accept the parameters being absent as well as present".
Maintain context for key usage mismatch errors in order to make them easier to interpret.
Avoids a possible type inference error when building in projects that also use jhpratt/deranged.
jhpratt/deranged.Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.103.0...v/0.103.1
Breaking change: add context to name validation errors. This adds a value to the CertNotValidForName error variant.
CertNotValidForName error variant.Error being Copy -- the above change required this, as it started to have an allocated field.CertNotValidYet, CertExpired, and CrlExpired error variants.rustls-pki-types. This removes the alg_id module from this crate's public interface.rustls-pki-types.aws_lc_rs feature to aws-lc-rs.NameIterator by @djc in https://github.com/rustls/webpki/pull/311AlgorithmIdentifier values from rustls-pki-types by @ctz in https://github.com/rustls/webpki/pull/304Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.102.8...v/0.103.0
Support for aws-lc-rs 1.9 added. This release adds supports for compressed EC public keys, when used with aws-lc-rs.
Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.102.7...v/0.102.8
Initial support for RFC 7250 "Raw public keys". A new RawPublicKeyEntity type has been added, offering a verify_signature() fn for verifying the signa
RawPublicKeyEntity type has been added, offering a verify_signature() fn for verifying the signature over a given message using a raw public key produced from a pki_types::SubjectPublicKeyInfoDer instance.Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.102.6...v/0.102.7
Add support for P-521 curve with SHA-256/SHA-384 digests
Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.102.5...v/0.102.6
EndEntityCert::subject_public_key_info() as added in 0.102.4 neglected to specify the return type's lifetime, limiting the visible lifetime to the lif
EndEntityCert::subject_public_key_info() as added in 0.102.4 neglected to specify the return type's lifetime, limiting the visible lifetime to the lifetime of the EndEntityCert. The actual lifetime was 'static; we've made this explicit and enabled warnings for elided_lifetimes_in_paths to avoid similar issues in the future.RevocationOptionsBuilder now offers a with_expiration_policy() fn for setting an ExpirationPolicy that will be used to determine how to handle CRLs th
RevocationOptionsBuilder now offers a with_expiration_policy() fn for setting an ExpirationPolicy that will be used to determine how to handle CRLs that have a NextUpdate value in the past. The default behaviour is to ignore the NextUpdate. Users wishing to use a stricter policy can do so by specifying ExpirationPolicy::Enforce. Revocation checking against an expired CRL will then produce an Error::CrlExpired error.EndEntityCert now offers a subject_public_key_info() fn for accessing the RFC 5280 pki_types::SubjectPublicKeyInfoDer.Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.102.3...v/0.102.4
New KeyUsage::required_if_present() fn for requiring a certificate to support the specified OID, if the certificate has EKUs.
KeyUsage::required_if_present() fn for requiring a certificate to support the specified OID, if the certificate has EKUs.Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.102.2...v/0.102.3
small nightly clippy fixes by @cpu in https://github.com/rustls/webpki/pull/222
Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.102.1...v/0.102.2
Added `webpki::aws_lc_rs::ECDSA_P521_SHA512`: support for P521-SHA512 signature verification.
webpki::aws_lc_rs::ECDSA_P521_SHA512: support for P521-SHA512 signature verification.Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.102.0...v/0.102.1
Improving API stability. This crate now uses types from rustls-pki-types; we expect this to reduce the number of breaking changes in rustls ecosystem.
cargo doc comments on private items by @cpu in https://github.com/rustls/webpki/pull/157dns_names helper, remove alloc req. by @cpu in https://github.com/rustls/webpki/pull/178Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.101.7...v/0.102.0
trust_anchor: clarify and rename extract_trust_anchor by @cpu in https://github.com/rustls/webpki/pull/201
Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.102.0-alpha.6...v/0.102.0-alpha.8
Nothing published for this version
build(deps): bump cryptography from 41.0.3 to 41.0.4 by @dependabot in https://github.com/rustls/webpki/pull/196
Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.102.0-alpha.4...v/0.102.0-alpha.6
Nothing published for this version
cert: retain CRL distribution points extension. by @cpu in https://github.com/rustls/webpki/pull/127
cargo doc comments on private items by @cpu in https://github.com/rustls/webpki/pull/157dns_names helper, remove alloc req. by @cpu in https://github.com/rustls/webpki/pull/178Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.101.6...v/0.102.0-alpha.4
Nothing published for this version
Nothing published for this version
Nothing published for this version
cert: retain CRL distribution points extension. by @cpu in https://github.com/rustls/webpki/pull/127
Pre-release.
Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.101.2...v/0.102.0-alpha.0
Upgrades *ring* to 0.17, and untrusted to 0.9. Note: since untrusted appears in the Error API this may be a breaking change for applications using two…
*ring* to 0.17, and untrusted to 0.9. Note: since untrusted appears in the Error API this may be a breaking change for applications using two untrusted versions.Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.101.6...v/0.101.7
The CertificateRevocationList trait's verify_signature Budget argument was removed. This was a semver incompatible change mistakenly introduced in v0.
CertificateRevocationList trait's verify_signature Budget argument was removed. This was a semver incompatible change mistakenly introduced in v0.101.5.Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.101.5...v/0.101.6
Path building complexity is now limited to a maximum budget of path finding operations, avoiding exponential processing time when encountering certifi
Error::BadDer when iterating certificates with printable string subject common names, or omitted common names encoded as an empty sequence.The following PRs were backported to the rel-0.101 branch in #170:
Thanks to all who have contributed, on behalf of the rustls team (@ctz, @cpu and @djc)!
certificate path building and verification is now capped at 100 signature validation operations to avoid the risk of CPU usage denial-of-service attac
Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.101.3...v/0.101.4
TlsServerTrustAnchors, TlsClientTrustAnchors, verify_is_valid_tls_server_cert and verify_is_valid_tls_client_cert deprecation notes improved.
TlsServerTrustAnchors, TlsClientTrustAnchors, verify_is_valid_tls_server_cert and verify_is_valid_tls_client_cert deprecation notes improved.Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.101.2...v/0.101.3
TlsServerTrustAnchors, TlsClientTrustAnchors, verify_is_valid_tls_server_cert and verify_is_valid_tls_client_cert are deprecated: use verify_for_usage…
TlsServerTrustAnchors, TlsClientTrustAnchors, verify_is_valid_tls_server_cert and verify_is_valid_tls_client_cert are deprecated: use verify_for_usage with KeyUsage::server_auth() or KeyUsage::client_auth() instead.Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.101.1...v/0.101.2
Fixed 32-bit architecture compatibility.
Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.101.0...v/0.101.1
*Breaking change*: added EndEntity::verify_is_valid_tls_client_cert argument for certificate revocation lists.
EndEntity::verify_is_valid_tls_client_cert
argument for certificate revocation lists.Time::try_from.From<DnsNameRef<'_> impl for DnsName.AsRef<[u8]> with AsRef<str> for DnsNameRef.EndEntityCert::verify_is_valid_tls_client_cert and
EndEntityCert::verify_is_valid_tls_server_cert.EndEntityCert::dns_names method for returning a list of DNS subject
alternate names from an end entity cert.EndEntityCert::verify_is_valid_for_subject_name to ignore invalid
names when verifying cert is valid for a provided subject.name_constraints test suite to be more generalized. by @cpu in https://github.com/rustls/webpki/pull/75untrusted::Input. by @cpu in https://github.com/rustls/webpki/pull/83Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.100.1...v/0.101.0
Path building complexity is now limited to a maximum budget of path finding operations, avoiding exponential processing time when encountering certifi
The following PRs were backported to the rel-0.100 branch in https://github.com/rustls/webpki/pull/172
Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.100.2...v/0.100.3
Thanks to all who have contributed, on behalf of the rustls team (@ctz, @cpu and @djc)!
certificate path building and verification is now capped at 100 signature validation operations to avoid the risk of CPU usage denial-of-service attac
Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.100.1...v/0.100.2
Relax constraint on serial number length.
Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/v/0.100.0...v/0.100.1
Restore webpki-0.22 naming and enact deprecations by @ctz in https://github.com/rustls/webpki/pull/27
First release of rustls-webpki crate.
EndEntityCert::verify_is_valid_for_subject_name was added, and
EndEntityCert::verify_is_valid_for_dns_name was removed.Error type non-exhaustive.Full Changelog: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/compare/0.17.0...v/0.100.0
Nothing published for this version
Nothing published for this version
Nothing published for this version
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